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Abstract
In  most  western  jurisdictions,  discrimination  law  prohibits  direct   discrimination,   indirect   discrimination,   and
harassment, on protected grounds, such as race, sex, etc. Workers who use the legislation,  or  assist  others  to  do  so,
need protection against retaliation by  their  employer.  Accordingly,  the  legislation  seeks  to  remove  deterrents  by
creating a fourth instance of discrimination, known in  Britain  as  victimisation.  The  statutory  formulas  are  sparse,
apparently providing employers no defence. Yet in some cases, courts sympathetic to the employer have  strained  the
formula to provide what amounts to a benign motive defence.  The  result  is  an  incoherent  body  of  case  law.  This
article explores the problem in Britain and the United States and attempts to settle upon a new  statutory  formula  that
would provide certainty and clarity, as well as fulfilling the ambition of the anti-victimisation doctrine.
1. INTRODUCTION
SCENARIO  No.  1:  A  worker  issues  discrimination  proceedings  against  her  employer  and  pending   the
outcome applies (unsuccessfully) for another job. Acting on  standard  legal  advice,  her  employer  refuses  to
provide a reference, in case anything said in it could prejudice the employer’s  defence.  The  reference  would
have been negative in  any  case  and  the  refusal  was  not  the  cause  of  the  worker  failing  to  get  the  job.
Nonetheless, the worker sues again, this time for victimisation.
SCENARIO  No.  2:  A  worker  issues  discrimination  proceedings  against  her  employer,   who,   following
standard  practice,  suspends  the  worker’s   internal   grievance   procedure,   pending   the   outcome   of   the
proceedings. The worker now sues for victimisation.
In these scenarios the employer has responded to legal proceedings in a predictable manner. It does not wish to  create
evidence that could prejudice its defence at the trial, for  instance,  by  making  informal  concessions  in  a  grievance
process, or omitting minor faults (relevant to the claim) in a job reference. Neither does it wish to  state  anything  that
could constrain its lawyers, in say, negotiation or tactics. In the second scenario, it may want to avoid  the  expense  of
duplicative proceedings. Yet, in these scenarios, the worker is denied a reference or grievance procedure  because  she
issued  a  discrimination  claim,  and  even  if  the  she  suffers  no  harm  by  this  (as  suggested  in  Scenario  No   1),
other workers, having seen that normal benefits of  employment  will  be  denied,  will  be  deterred  from  making  or
supporting allegations of discrimination. From this perspective, policy dictates that these employers  should  be  liable
for victimisation.
The  scenarios  represent  a  universal  ‘victimisation  dilemma’.  In  the  United  States,   the   dilemma   was
characterised thus:
We recognize the countervailing concerns in this area of the law. On the one hand, we worry that  employers
will be paralyzed into inaction once an employee  has  lodged  a  complaint  ....  On  the  other  hand,  we  are
concerned  about  the  chilling  effect  on  employee  complaints  resulting  from  an   employer’s   retaliatory
actions.[1]
The dilemma is one of policy. However, the courts are hampered in solving it  by  the  constrained  statutory  formula,
which provides for liability simply where the employer treats the worker less favourably by reason  that,  or  because,
the worker has been involved in a protected activity, such as bringing or supporting discrimination proceedings. There
is no defence. And so, on the face of it, employers should be liable in these scenarios. However, in  a  series  of  cases,
British courts have sided with the employers, save where the employer has exceeded normal  practice.  In  the  United
States, courts have vacillated, whilst the scant case law  of  the  ECJ  suggests  that  courts  should  take  the  workers’
perspective. It follows that at least some of these decisions do not  sit  easily  with  the  statutory  formula  and  appear
inconsistent with each other.
The aim of this article is to resolve, as far as possible, the victimisation dilemma. It investigates the  problem
exposed by the body of case law in both Britain and the United States. It will explore the  dilemma,  especially  in  the
two scenarios presented, highlight any technical shortcomings or triumphs of the  legislative  formulas  and  case  law,
and  evaluate  the  policy  considerations  behind  the  legislation  and  the  decisions.  It  will  explore  analogies  with
conventional discrimination and alternative theories of victimisation, and conclude that some  victimisation  cases  are
more analogous to disability-related-discrimination. Consequently  it  will  suggest  alternative  statutory  formulas  to
resolve the shortcomings and fulfil the statutory purpose. It will conclude that  the  victimisation  dilemma  cannot  be
fully resolved, but propose a new statutory formula with limited general and specific  defences  and  guidelines  which
will produce clearer boundaries and make this area of the law more predictable for employers and workers alike.
2. THE LEGISLATION
The formula for victimisation is as follows:
Race Relations Act 1976
2. Discrimination by way of victimisation[2]
(1) A person (‘the  discriminator’)  discriminates  against  another  person  (‘the  person  victimised’)  in  any
circumstances relevant for the purposes  of  any  provision  of  this  Act  if  he  treats  the  person  victimised  less
favourably than in those circumstances he treats or would treat  other  persons,  and  does  so  by  reason  that  the
person victimised has -
(a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act; or
(b)  given  evidence  or  information  in  connection  with  proceedings  brought  by  any  person  against  the
discriminator or any other person under this Act; or
(c) otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act in  relation  to  the  discriminator  or  any  other
person; or
(d) alleged that the discriminator  or  any  other  person  has  committed  an  act  which  (whether  or  not  the
allegation so states) would amount to a contravention of this Act,
or by reason that the discriminator knows that the person victimised  intends  to  do  any  of  those  things,  or
suspects that the person victimised has done, or intends to do, any of them.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to treatment of a person by reason of  any  allegation  made  by  him  if  the
allegation was false and not made in good faith.
Paragraphs (a) to (d) define the ‘protected acts’. The formula provides three elements: (1) the worker  did  a  protected
act; (2) the employer treated the worker less favourably than it treated (or would have treated) others; and (3) it did so
‘because’  (or  ‘by  reason  that’)  the  worker  did  the  protected  act.  In  addition,  the  treatment   must   have   been
employment-related.
The  Government  has  proposed  abolishing  the  comparative  element   from   this   definition   so   that   no
comparison of how other workers were treated would be required for liability.[3] As such, element  (2)  above,  would
be reworded: ‘the employer subjected the worker to a detriment.’
The parent  directives  provide  a  more  general,  but  essentially  similar,  formula.  For  instance,  the  Race
Directive  provides  that  that  member  States  shall  ‘protect  individuals  from  any  adverse   treatment   or   adverse
consequence as a reaction to a complaint or to proceedings aimed at enforcing complying with the  principle  of  equal
treatment’.[4]
The federal legislation in the United States is formulated in a similar way to the UK version. Title VII of  the
Civil Rights Act 1964 outlaws employment discrimination ‘because of’ race, colour, sex, religion, and national origin.
In addition section 704(a) outlaws victimisation thus:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees  or
applicants for employment ... because he has opposed any practice made  an  unlawful  employment  practice
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in  any  manner  in  an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.[5]
For those unfamiliar with it, the  hierarchy  of  American  cases  included  in  this  article  begins  with  District  Court
decisions, which may be appealed to a court of  appeals  which  are  distributed  by  13  geographical  Circuits  (which
accounts for some of the discrepancies between court of appeals’ decisions). The final and  unifying  appeal  forum  is
the Supreme Court of the United States.
A. The Protected Act
The British formula covers a broad range of acts. Note the ‘catch-all’ paragraph  (1)(c).  Sub-section  (2)  provides  an
exception only where an allegation was false and not made in good faith. The only significant case law on this  matter
restricts the formula in sub-section (1)(d) to allegations that actually amount to  a  contravention  of  the  Act.[6]  Title
VII slightly looser formula simply protects those who  have  ‘opposed’  unlawful  discrimination  or  ‘participated’  in
proceedings.6a
B. Employment-related
Unlike Title VII, which outlaws simply discriminatory ‘employment practices’,  the  British  legislation  specifies  the
employment practices where discrimination is unlawful. This includes recruitment, and in addition:
(a) in the terms of employment which he affords him; or
(b) in the way he affords him access to  opportunities  for  promotion,  transfer  or  training,  or  to  any  other
benefits, facilities or services, or by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford him access to them; or
(c) by dismissing him, or subjecting him to any other detriment.[7]
This rather specific list concludes with a ‘catch-all’ phrase, any other detriment. For liability,  the  victimisation  must
relate to recruitment, or paragraphs (a), (b), or for a dismissal, or any other detriment. The obvious purpose of this last
element is, on the one hand, to catch any other unspecified treatment, whilst on the  other,  to  preserve  the  limitation
that the treatment complained of is employment-related.
However, courts have become preoccupied with the standard of harm required to  meet  this  element.  Thus,
there is a class of cases where the issue of the standard of harm for liability has arisen twice: once for  less  favourable
treatment, and again for subjecting to a detriment.  Given  that  the  courts  in  the  series  of  victimisation  cases  each
proceeded on the basis the denial of a reference or a grievance process fell  under  any  other  detriment,  this  element
will require some exploration.
C. Less Favourable Treatment
(i) What is Less Favourable?
Under the statutory formula, the treatment of the worker  must  be  less  favourable  than  any  treatment  given  to  the
comparator. British courts have been generous to claimants on this issue. The test is a mix of subjective and objective:
if the claimant perceived the treatment as less favourable, and was not unreasonable to do so, then the  test  is  met.  In
other words, it is not necessary that every reasonable person in the shoes of  the  claimant  would  have  perceived  the
treatment as less favourable. All that is required is that the claimant did, and that  the  claimant’s  perception  was  not
unreasonable. The following examples illustrate this point.
In Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan,[8] the Chief Constable refused to give a reference to  Sergeant
Khan  in  support  of  a  job  application  with  the  Norfolk  Police,  because  Khan  was  pursuing  a  claim  of   racial
discrimination against the West Yorkshire Police, his current employer. Nonetheless, the Norfolk Police invited Khan
for an interview, but failed to appoint him. It was common ground that  had  a  reference  been  given,  containing  the
Yorkshire Police’s low assessment of Sergeant Khan’s managerial skills, he would have  stood  less  chance  of  being
short-listed for an interview. Accordingly, in Khan’s action for victimisation, the Chief  Constable  argued  that  Khan
had been treated more, not less, favourably. The House of Lords  rejected  that  argument.  Lord  Scott  concluded:  ‘It
cannot... be enough for section 2(1) purposes simply to show that the complainant has  been  treated  differently.  ....  I
think it  suffices  if  the  complainant  can  reasonably  say  that  he  would  have  preferred  not  to  have  been  treated
differently.’[9] This approach echoes  the  direct  sex  discrimination  case  R  v  Birmingham  City  Council,  ex  parte
EOC,[10] where it was held that the denial of a  grammar  school  place  (to  a  girl)  was  less  favourable  in  spite  of
evidence that the education standards of grammar and comprehensive schools were comparable.  In  non-employment
cases, the courts have been equally relaxed. In Gill v El  Vino[11]  a  ‘traditional’  wine  bar  served  only  men  at  the
counter, and provided  table  service  for  women.  The  wine  bar  argued  that  although  women  were  being  treated
differently, the alternative was no less favourable. The  Court  of  Appeal  disagreed,  holding  that  women  had  been
treated less favourably because, unlike the men, they were denied a  choice,  which  the  female  plaintiff,  reasonably,
valued.
In each of these cases, it could just as logically be concluded that  a  reasonable  person  in  the  shoes  of  the
claimant would not have found the treatment less favourable. For instance, a worker may  not  have  been  worried  by
the refusal of a negative reference, a parent may  have  been  happy  with  the  evidence  that  the  comprehensive  and
grammar schools provided the same standard of tuition, and a female customer may have  been  perfectly  happy  with
the table service offered by the wine bar. But does not matter. So long as a reasonable  person  could  have  found  the
treatment less favourable (and the claimant did so), the element is met.
(ii) The Comparison - Treated Less Favourably Than Whom?
Until this element is  repealed,[12]  the  comparison  should  be  handled  carefully.  The  phrase  ‘he  treats  or  would
treat other persons’ in sub-section (1) (emphasis  supplied)  allows  the  comparator  to  be  real  or  hypothetical.  The
proper comparison is between the treatment of alleged victim and the treatment that was, or would  have  been,  given
to another, who had not done any element of the protected act. It has proved rather too  easy  for  tribunals  to  assume
that the comparator has done part of the protected act as well, with predictable results. In Kirby v Manpower  Services
Commission,[13] an employee at a job centre was moved to  less  desirable  work  because  he  disclosed  confidential
information regarding suspected discrimination by  some  employers.  The  EAT  rejected  his  claim  of  victimisation
because  any  person  disclosing  confidential  information  of  any  nature  would  have  been  moved  to  other  work,
therefore the treatment was not less favourable.
In Aziz v Trinity Street Taxis,[14] the complainant  was  an  Asian  taxicab  proprietor  and  a  member  of  an
association of taxicab operators. When the association required him to pay £1,000 to have a third taxi  admitted  to  its
radio system, he felt he was being unfairly treated on racial grounds. He  recorded  secretly  conversations  with  other
taxi drivers, and made an unsuccessful complaint to a tribunal about the additional fee. The recordings  were  revealed
during the hearing of that complaint. As a result, the association expelled him on the ground  that  the  making  of  the
recordings was a serious breach of the trust that had to exist between members. Aziz complained of victimisation. The
association argued that as it would expel any member making secret recordings, Aziz was not treated less  favourably.
The Court of Appeal, overruling Kirby, rejected this argument, noting that if the protected act itself constituted part of
the comparison all complaints of victimisation would ‘necessarily fail’ if  the  defendant  could  show  he  would  treat
equally badly all those who did the protected  act;  ‘an  absurd  result.’[15]  The  comparator  should  be  a  non-Asian
member of the taxi association who  had  not  made  secret  tape  recordings.  Under  this  test,  Aziz  was  treated  less
favourably than this comparator.
D. Causation - ‘By Reason That’
Perhaps the most straightforward  interpretation  of  the  phrase  by  reason  that  came  from  the  House  of  Lords  in
Nagarajan v London Regional Transport,[16] where the majority[17] followed the ‘objective and not  subjective’[18]
or ‘straightforward’,[19] approach, applied to the parallel element for direct  discrimination  (on  the  ground  of  (sex,
race etc)), where Lord Goff adopted a but for test.[20] In Nagarajan, Lord Nicholls concluded ‘I can see no reason  to
apply a different approach to section 2 [RRA 1976].’[21]  Thus,  it  seemed,  the  correct  approach  was  to  ask:  ‘but
for the protected act, would the claimant have been less favourably treated?’ It  will  become  apparent  below  that  in
victimisation cases at least, the courts have drifted away from the but for test.
3. WITHHOLDING A REFERENCE
This scenario has two noticeable features. First, the employer has not acted out of malice, but merely  to  defend  itself
in litigation. Second, the claimant apparently suffered no harm.
In Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan,[22]  it  will  be  recalled,[23]  the  employer  refused  to
provide the claimant with a job reference (which would have been negative) save it ‘...  might  compromise  the  chief
constable  and  other  respondents’  handling  of  the  case’.[24]  Consequently,  Khan  brought  a  separate   claim   of
victimisation. The House of Lords unanimously rejected this claim, holding that  the  Chief  Constable  had  not  acted
‘by reason  that’  Khan  had  brought  proceedings,  because  the  employer  had  acted  ‘honestly  and  reasonably’  in
accordance  with  ‘perfectly  understandable  advice.’[25]   In  coming  to  this  conclusion,  the  House  relied  on  the
distinction,  made  in  Cornelius  v  University  College  of  Swansea,[26]  between  a   reaction   to   the   bringing   of
proceedings (unlawful) and their existence (lawful). 26a
In the US case, Sparrow v Piedmont Health,[27] the claimant worked for a nursing agency, and after filing  a
complaint of sex discrimination, she requested  a  reference  from  her  supervisor,  Mr  Clark,  who  refused.  Instead,
Piedmont wrote to her lawyer stating:
Under the circumstances presently existing as to the type of charge that Mrs. Sparrow  has  made,  Mr.  Clark
does not feel at all comfortable with making any kind of recommendation. We would want you to understand
that this is in no sense a form of retaliation, since whether he makes a recommendation at all is a  choice  that
we feel he has. He would have no problem with a recommendation were  this  charge  not  still  pending,  but
since it is pending it is his feeling that  Mrs.  Sparrow  may  attempt  to  use  the  recommendation  adversely
against the Agency whether it be very favourable, favourable or not at all favourable.
As in Khan, the reference was refused on legal advice that it could compromise the  employer’s  defence.  The  advice
differed slightly, because in Khan the employer was minded to provide a negative reference. In Sparrow,  the  lawyers
feared a reference of any sort (be it negative, neutral, or positive) could be used against the employer.
In the event, this refusal  caused  Ms  Sparrow  no  harm,  as  her  prospective  employers  did  not  ask  for  a
reference. And so, like Khan, this is a ‘no reference-no harm’ case. However, in this case the employer was  liable  for
victimisation. The District Court’s reasoning was sparse,  stating  simply  that  it  ‘sympathises’  with  the  employer’s
position, but employers are liable if they refuse to provide a reference ‘solely  because’[28]  an  employee  has  issued
Title VII proceedings.
4. SUSPENDING GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
Before considering how this relates to the suspension of a grievance process, it is necessary to consider the  impact  of
the relatively recent  -  but  transitory  -  compulsory  statutory  grievance  procedure,  which  lays  down  a  minimum
standard.
A. The Statutory Grievance Procedure
The dispute resolution procedures are set out in  the  Employment  Act  2002,  sections  29-33  and  Schedule  2,  with
further details provided by the Employment Act  2002  (Dispute  Resolution)  Regulations  2004.[29]  The  legislation
provides one scheme for discipline and dismissal, and a parallel one for grievances. The statutory procedure came into
force on 1 October 2004.  However,  following  an  unfavourable  reception,  the  scheme  is  due  for  repeal  in  April
2009.[30] So, what follows is of limited application.
The statutory grievance procedure consists of three steps.[31] Step one requires the aggrieved worker to send
a written complaint to the employer. Step two is a meeting between the  two  and  a  decision  by  the  employer.  Step
three arises where the worker wishes to appeal against the employer’s decision; here a further meeting and decision  is
required. In certain circumstances a ‘modified’ procedure applies, involving just two  steps.[32]  Step  one  requires  a
written complaint including its basis, whilst step two is a written response. The procedures do not apply at all  if  inter
alia ‘the party has been subjected to harassment and has reasonable grounds  to  believe  that  ...  complying  with  the
procedure would result in his being subjected to further harassment.’[33]
The principal incentive for employees  to  comply  with  the  statutory  grievance  procedure  is  that  a  claim
cannot be presented to an employment tribunal until the employee has sent a ‘step one’ written complaint  and  waited
28 days for the employer to respond.[34] The sanction for not  following  the  statutory  procedure  is  a  reduction,  or
increase, (depending on who was at fault) of  up  to  50  per  cent  of  any  award,  as  the  tribunal  considers  just  and
equitable.[35] Further, if the employer is at fault, any dismissal is deemed automatically unfair.[36]
The corresponding scheme for discipline and dismissal follows the same lines, save that step one  is  initiated
by the employer. In cases of dismissal, the grievance procedure does not apply. Thus,  where  an  employee  considers
the dismissal was discriminatory, there is no need to follow the grievance procedure before presenting  a  claim  to  an
employment tribunal.[37] However, where  the  employee  considers  that  disciplinary  action  is  discriminatory,  the
employee must issue a ‘step one’ written complaint to the employer, either before  any  appeal,  or  if  no  disciplinary
procedure was followed, before presenting a claim to an employment tribunal.[38]
The essential rule here for the present purpose is that  an  employer  cannot  lawfully  suspend  this  statutory
grievance process. Thus, an employee who has waited 28 days after issuing  the  ‘step  one’  letter  of  complaint  may
issue legal proceedings knowing that the statutory grievance procedure cannot be suspended  in  response.  Of  course,
the statutory procedures are  rudimentary,  and  fall  well  short  of  more  elaborate  procedures  used  by  many  large
employers, or the ACAS recommendations.[39] Thus, where an employer suspends its more elaborate  procedure  and
complies only with the statutory minimum, the suspension will fall to be judged under the victimisation provisions.
B. Suspending the Grievance Process and Victimisation
The various approaches to this  issue  are  represented  by  three  cases.  First,  in  Cornelius  v  University  College  of
Swansea,[40] Ms Cornelius brought proceedings against her employer under the  Sex  Discrimination  Act  1975  and,
pending the outcome, she was refused a transfer request  and  access  to  the  grievance  procedure.  Consequently  she
brought a separate action of victimisation. The Court of Appeal rejected her claim for two  reasons,  the  first  centring
on the causative element:
The existence of the  proceedings  plainly  did  influence  [the  employer’s]  decisions.  No  doubt,  like  most
experienced administrators, they recognised the risk of acting in a way which might embarrass  the  handling
or be inconsistent with the outcome of current proceedings. They accordingly wished to defer action until the
proceedings were over. But that had ... nothing to do with the  appellant’s  conduct  in  bringing  proceedings
under the Act.[41]
In other words, the Court distinguished between the bringing of  proceedings  and  their  existence.  This  enabled  the
Court to find that the protected act (the bringing of proceedings) was not the cause of the suspension of the  grievance
proceedings.
The second reason given was that Cornelius was not treated less favourably. The Court offered no  reasoning
for this decision, stating only, ‘There is no  finding  that  ...  [less  favourable  treatment]  is  made  out,  and  it  would
certainly not be safe to infer that conclusion from the findings which have been made.’[42]
In the US case, EEOC v Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities and University Professionals
of Illinois,[43] the collective agreement provided a  general  policy  to  withdraw  the  grievance  procedure  from  any
worker  who  instigated  legal  proceedings  against  the  employer.  One  Professor  Lewis  instigated   the   grievance
procedure because he was not recommended for tenure.  His  complaint  was  that  this  decision  breached  University
procedure. Lewis’s grievance claim took more than a year to process. In the meantime, he issued proceedings  for  age
discrimination in relation to his tenure claim, under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967  (ADEA
1967).[44] In accordance with its policy, the employer withdrew from the grievance  process.  On  Lewis’  behalf,  the
EEOC[45]  brought these proceedings for victimisation. The employer defended inter alia arguing that the policy was
invoked in good faith to save duplicative litigation. The Court wholly rejected this:
[The legislation] is concerned with the effect of discrimination against employees  who  pursue  their  federal
rights, not the motivation of the employer who discriminates. [It] explicitly  prohibits  discrimination  against
employees who engage in protected activity....  [A]n  employer  may  offer  a  legitimate  non-discriminatory
reason for taking an adverse action against an employee who has engaged  in  protected  activity,  ie  that  the
employer took the adverse action for some  reason  unrelated  to  the  employee’s  participation  in  protected
activity. However, the employer may not proffer a good faith reason for taking retaliatory action.[46]
The Court bolstered its opinion using direct discrimination as an analogy,  noting  that  ‘an  employer’s  alleged  good
faith is irrelevant, just as evidence of good faith has been held to be irrelevant  in  a  case  involving  a  discriminatory
policy.’[47]
On a point of  statutory  interpretation,  the  Court  noted  that  the  legislation  provided  no  exceptions  to  a
retaliation claim, such as when retaliation would be rational or financially prudent, or  in  ‘good  faith’,  or  otherwise.
Without a hint of sarcasm, the Court advised: ‘If the Board wants to lobby for a benign discrimination exception ... its
appeal would be appropriately directed to Congress rather than this Court.’[48]
A second argument, relating to  the  less  favourable  treatment  element,  was  rejected  also.  The  employer
emphasised that the policy was not targeted at those who make discrimination claims; it was broader than that,  aimed
at any worker who brought proceedings, whatever their  nature.  Thus,  the  employer  contended,  the  policy  did  not
discriminate against those who brought discrimination claims. The Court rejected this argument:
The contention that the  policy  is  any  less  discriminatory  when  its  scope  is  broadened  is  unpersuasive.
Employees’ rights under [the retaliation provisions] would be as effectively stifled under either policy.[49]
A third argument put forward was that the difference in treatment caused Lewis no harm. The Court  rejected
this, largely on the facts. If Professor Lewis had waited for the year-long grievance process to conclude,  his  litigation
would have been time-barred. Second, his internal complaint related to the  non-adherence  to  rules  of  tenure,  rather
than age discrimination, so different issues were to be decided.
The third case  is  US  v  New  York  City  Transit  Authority.[50]  Here  the  employer  operated  a  voluntary
grievance procedure. However, if a complaint became  formalised,[51]  the  employer  would  transfer  it  to  its  legal
department and terminate the internal grievance procedure.
A court of appeals held that the policy did not amount to victimisation. It declared that ‘reasonable defensive
measures’ were lawful, even though they result in adverse and differential adverse  treatment.  A  decision  otherwise,
the Court stated, ‘would impair the ability of an employer to place its  defence in  the  hands  of  counsel,’  preventing
‘the most basic precautions to defend against the claim’ and the securing of  attorney-client  privilege  to  ‘protect  the
fruits of investigation.’ Further, findings by the grievance process may be used to prejudice the employer’s defence  at
trial. Lastly, the policy is efficient and effective because it avoids parallel  and  duplicative  proceedings.  Overall,  the
employer should be ‘free to choose to act in  a  benign  and  sympathetic  way  by  satisfying  grievances  and  settling
disputes, or to proceed aggressively with litigation.’[52]
C. Time Bars and the Grievance Process
There may be tactical reasons why a claimant launches legal action before the grievance process is complete. But  one
common reason will be to avoid being time-barred and  losing  any  legal  remedy.  Where  the  employer’s  grievance
process is likely to drag on beyond the three-month limitation period,[53]  the  worker  has  little  option  but  to  issue
proceedings. Indeed, one reason the worker  in  the  Board  of  Governors  case  launched  his  litigation  was  that  the
grievance process was likely to take a year to complete. Perhaps surprisingly, the courts will not normally  extend  the
time limit because the claimant has waited for the outcome of the grievance process before issuing proceedings.[54]
This procedural restriction is highly aggravating here. Effectively, the worker may choose either an  informal
(and presumably more amicable) solution or litigation.
5. TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE CASES
To evaluate technically this apparent diversity of opinion in the cases, it  is  necessary  to  examine  them  element-by-
element.
A. Less Favourable Treatment
In Cornelius,[55] the Court of Appeal ruled, albeit obscurely, that the suspension did  not  amount  to  less  favourable
treatment. To reach this conclusion it must have used the since-discredited[56] Kirby comparator. This is revealed  by
imposing the correct (‘Aziz’) comparator, that is a person who had brought no proceedings at all.  The  College  would
not have denied the grievance procedure to this person. The only way it could have concluded that Cornelius  had  not
been treated less favourably is by using a comparator who had brought proceedings, but not for discrimination; that  is
a Kirby comparator.[57]
               This result was achieved with  an  apparently  different  approach  to  the  same  element  in  New  York  City
Transit.[58]  The  Court  of  Appeals’  reasoning  fell  under  this  element,   as   the   employer   conceded   the   other
elements.[59] As noted above,[60] in the court’s view, it did not matter that the  suspension  could  ‘result  in  adverse
and differential adverse treatment,’ if this was brought about by the employer taking ‘reasonable defensive measures’.
It reconciled these apparently conflicting statements by distinguishing between discrimination (unlawful) and  adverse
treatment (not  inherently  unlawful).  The  court  did  not  expand  this  logic,  and  as  such  it  appears  rather  brutal.
However, imposing an Aziz comparator on the facts once again reveals that the reasoning  is  rooted  in  the  choice  of
comparator. An Aziz comparator would have been a worker who had not filed legal  proceedings  of  any  nature.  The
employer would not have suspended the  grievance  process  for  this  comparator.  Only  if  the  comparator  were  an
employee who had filed legal proceedings, but not for discrimination, would he have been treated the same. Thus,  the
court’s decision is dependant on a Kirby comparator, and the basis of its decision on this element is identical to that of
Cornelius.
This latent use of the Kirby comparator reveals a  good  deal  of  sympathy  for  the  employers’  perspective.
After all, the essence of their argument is that they are treating the (discrimination) claimant no  less  favourably  than
they would treat any other claimant. But there are overriding objections to this approach.  First,  it  fails  to  appreciate
the worker’s perspective, a requirement of EC law.[61] Second, as Lord Scott observed in Khan:
‘It would enable employers to victimise  employees  who  brought  race  discrimination  proceedings  against
them provided they, the employers, were prepared similarly to victimise any employee who had the  temerity
to sue them for anything.’[62]
Third, as noted in Aziz, where the comparator is endowed with doing the protected act,  the  ‘absurd  result’  would  be
that claims would necessarily fail where the employer would treat the claimant and the comparator equally  badly.[63]
Given this stark choice, the better solution is to opt for the Aziz comparator, which at  least  allows  the  merits  of  the
employer’s case to be decided under one of the other perhaps more flexible elements, rather  than  scupper  all  claims
from the outset.[64]
A different approach  is  apparent  in  EEOC  v  Board  of  Governors.[65]  A  court  of  appeals  rejected  the
employer’s argument that as it suspends its grievance process  for  any  worker  who  files  a  complaint,  of  whatever
nature, it did not discriminate against the plaintiff. The  comparison  with  ‘any  worker’  indicates  that  the  employer
envisaged  a  Kirby  comparator.  However,  as  noted  above,  the  court  of  appeals  rejected  this  argument  because
broadening the challenged practice to cover all workers did not change the plaintiff’s position, whose rights  remained
‘effectively stifled.’[66] 
The  court  is  less  concerned  with  how  the  employer  would  treat  others,  than  how  it  has  treated   this
discrimination claimant. This suggests that the court is not concerned with a comparison at all. Instead, it is concerned
with what it perceives as the statutory purpose, which is stretching somewhat  the  statutory  word  ‘discriminate’,  but
arrives at a sensible solution, which is to jettison the comparative element and focus on the treatment of  the  claimant.
Of course, in Britain, this may become a reality should the Government fulfil its proposal to  replace  the  comparative
element with a simple requirement that the employer has ‘caused a detriment’.[67] Until such a time courts should use
the Aziz comparator.
B. ‘By Reason That’, Causation and Motive
This element was discussed explicitly in Cornelius, Board of Governors, Khan, and Sparrow (briefly); and  implicitly
in New York City Transit. In essence, the arguments centre on a benign motive  defence.  This  was  expressed  by  the
employer in Board of Governors, and roundly rejected.[68] It can also be detected in Cornelius,  where  the  Court  of
Appeal compared the employer to  ‘most  experienced  administrators,’  when  distinguishing  the  bringing  from  the
existence of the proceedings.[69] The House of Lords built on this logic in Khan, and ventured a step further,  holding
that an employer acting honestly and  reasonably  should  not  be  liable  for  victimisation.[70]  More  recently,  in  St
Helens BC v Derbyshire,[71] the House of Lords has rowed back from this position by ‘reinterpreting’ Khan as a case
turning on the element of any other detriment.
(i) The Distinction Between the Bringing and the Existence of Proceedings
This distinction is as artificial as it sounds. Its futility is realised by adding a second protected act to the  claim,  which
could arise, for instance, if the claimant had ‘otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act’.[72]  As  well
as having brought proceedings, the claimant was ‘otherwise’ maintaining them in existence. After all,  on  the  court’s
logic, if maintaining proceedings is different from commencing them, sub-paragraph (c) seems  the  appropriate  place
for such a claim.[73]
Further, this fine distinction between the bringing and existing of proceedings shows a  drift  away  from  the
‘straightforward’ approach adopted  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  Nagarajan,  where  Lord  Nicholls  said:  ‘...  in  the
application  of  this  legislation  legalistic  phrases,  as  well  as  subtle  distinctions,  are   better   avoided   so   far   as
possible.’[74]
This distinction, which asks why the employer so acted, is based on  the  employer’s  perspective.  According
the House of Lords in St Helens, EC law now dictates it is the worker’s perspective that should prevail.[75]
It is artificial, unduly legalistic, and contrary to EC law. As such it serves no useful purpose.
(ii) A Benign Motive Defence?
Of course, what the  courts  were  trying  to  achieve  with  this  distinction  (between  the  bringing  and  existence  of
proceedings) is exoneration for employers who  defend  litigation  in  the  normal  way.  This  is  apparent  from  Lord
Hoffman’s observation in Khan:
... once proceedings have been commenced, a new relationship is created between the  parties.  They  are  not
only employer and employee but also adversaries in litigation. The existence of that  adversarial  relationship
may reasonably cause the employer to behave  in  a  way  which  treats  the  employee  less  favourably  than
someone  who  had  not  commenced  such  proceedings.  But  the  treatment  need  not  be,   consciously   or
unconsciously, a response to the commencement of proceedings. It may simply be a  reasonable  response  to
the need to protect the employer’s interests as a party to the litigation.[76]
Here, in one piece of reasoning, Lord Hoffman combines the distinction with a ‘reasonable’  response  ‘to  protect  the
employer’s interests’.
This approach is also apparent in New York City Transit.[77] Although the causative element  was  conceded
by the employer, parts of the judgment suggest that the employer’s motive was the real reason for the decision:
At some level of generality, any  action  taken  by  an  employer  for  the  purpose  of  defending  against  the
employee’s charge can be characterized as adverse to the employee. Ordinary defensive measures  are  taken
for the very purpose of defeating the employee’s  claim.  Even  mediation  and  settlement  are  steps  that  an
employer takes to promote its ultimate self-interest.[78]
In addition,  the  court  alluded  to  an  employer’s  ‘reasonable  defensive  measures’[79]  to  prevent  prejudicing  the
employer’s defence at trial. The judgment placed the ‘ordinary’ and ‘reasonable’ conduct of the employer  above  any
consequential adverse effect to the plaintiff. None of it relates to the comparison, and it suggests that that much of  the
reasoning in this decision was based around the causative element, despite the employer’s concession.
               This sympathy for the ‘reasonable’ employer suggests that British and American  judges  have  recognised  a
benign motive defence. The first suggestion of a benign motive defence in British victimisation cases arose  in  Aziz  v
Trinity Street Taxis.[80] Here,  it  will  be  recalled,  a  taxi  association  expelled  a  member  for  making  secret  tape
recordings to support a complaint of racial discrimination. Although the Court of Appeal  found  he  had  been  treated
less favourably, it then went on to hold that this was not because  of  the  protected  act,  but  because  of  a  breach  of
confidence.[81] On behalf of the court, Slade LJ explained that the victimisation provisions:
... are concerned  with  the  motive  which  caused  the  alleged  discriminator  to  treat  the  complainant  less
favourably than other persons. In our judgment ... [it] contemplates a motive which is consciously  connected
with the race relations legislation.[82]
The House of Lords later disapproved of this quote,  but  not  the  decision.[83]  Nonetheless,  the  theme  returned  in
Khan, with Lord Scott stating that the statutory phrase by reason that  suggested  ‘motive’,[84]  whilst  Lord  Nicholls
said, ‘Unlike causation, this is a subjective test’,[85]  implying  the  defendant’s  motive  was  the  key.  Elsewhere  in
Khan, the judges used different language to express the same thing, holding  that  an  employer  acting  ‘honestly  and
reasonably’ should not be liable for victimisation.[86]
But, in St Helens BC v Derbyshire,[87] the House of Lords reinterpreted Khan,  stating  that  the  honest  and
reasonable ‘defence’  was  simply  another  way  of  expressing  that  the  worker  had  suffered  no  detriment:  if  the
employer acted honestly and reasonably, it could not cause the worker a detriment.[88] Only Baroness Hale was more
trenchant, stating: ‘It would be better if the [honest and reasonable] “defence” were laid to  rest  and  the  language  of
the legislation, construed in the light of the requirements of the Directives, applied.’[89]
The flaw in the majority’s logic is that in most cases an employer defending litigation will cause a detriment,
even though it acted just as ‘honestly and reasonably’ as Khan’s employer.[90] The denial of a grievance process or  a
job reference normally will cause a detriment. If a case came before the House precisely the same as  Khan,  save  that
the denial of the reference did cause the claimant harm (eg because it would have been positive), a court either  would
have to find for the claimant, leaving  Khan  marooned  and  fit  only  to  be  distinguished  to  death,  or  find  for  the
employer on the basis that it acted honestly and reasonably  even  though  the  claimant  had  been  harmed.  Thus,  an
honest and reasonable response by an employer normally cannot be equated with causing a worker  no  detriment.[91]
Despite the opinions in St Helens, the deciding factor in Khan was the employer’s reason, or  motive,  for  acting,  not
the effect on the claimant, and the honest and reasonable defence survives.[92]
               Once it is established that the decisions in Cornelius and Khan (and New York  City  Transit)  turned  on  the
employer’s benign motive, it becomes easier to evaluate  them.  The  first  and  most  obvious  problem  for  a  benign
motive defence is that it does not appear in the legislation.[93]
               The legitimacy of such a defence has often been questioned  using  the  meaning  of  the  apparently  parallel
definition of direct discrimination. Here, there is discrimination if the employer treats the  worker  less  favourably  on
the ground of sex, or race, etc. The phrase on the ground of is the supposed counterpart of the phrase  by  reason  that.
In  the  United  States,  Title  VII  of  the  Civil  Rights  Act  1964  more  simply  repeats  the  word  because  for   this
element.[94] For direct discrimination, a benign motive defence strictly is outlawed.  This  is  because  it  could  allow
employers to cite ‘customer preference’ or ‘appeasing the workforce’ as the motive for treating protected  groups  less
favourably.
For instance, in Diaz v Pan American World Airways[95] a ‘customer preference’ for female cabin crew was
rejected by a court of  appeals  as  a  defence  to  direct  discrimination  claim  brought  by  a  male  applicant.  In  R  v
Commission for Racial Equality ex parte Westminster City Council,[96]  the  council  dismissed  a  newly-hired  black
worker because of pressure from the white workforce to revert to  the  word-of-mouth  hiring  practice.  The  Court  of
Appeal found the council liable for direct discrimination. Likewise, in  Goodman v Lukens Steel[97] the US  Supreme
Court  found  a  union  liable  for  direct  discrimination  against  its  black  membership  for  failing  to  challenge  the
employer’s racially discriminatory practices, even though the union’s stance was not based in racial prejudice,  but  in
deference to its white membership, and/or to gain favour with the employer to achieve other goals. Similarly,  the  US
Supreme Court found an employer liable for refusing to hire fertile women on health  grounds.[98]  The  Court  stated
that direct discrimination: ‘... does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on  the  explicit  terms  of
the discrimination.... The beneficence of an employer’s purpose does not undermine  the  conclusion  that  an  explicit
gender-based policy is sex discrimination.’[99]
This was the thinking behind the but for test decreed by Lord Goff in James  v  Eastleigh,[100]  and  adopted
for the victimisation provisions in Nagarajan.[101] In  the  Board  of  Governors  case,  the  court  similarly  used  the
parallel with direct discrimination when rejecting the benign motive defence.[102]
The point of the but for test, according  to  Lord  Goff,  was  to  avoid  questions  of  motive.[103]  But  more
recently, the House of Lords has drifted away from the but for test. Most notably, in  Shamoon  v  Chief  Constable  of
the RUC,[104] a sex direct discrimination claim, the but for test was not mentioned. Instead, the Law Lords’ speeches
asked why the claimant was treated so. What few other comments were  made  on  the  issue  suggested  that  tribunals
should look for a discriminatory motive;[105] and that the relevant circumstances for the comparison should be  those
that the employer took into account,[106] again pointing to a subjective approach.
However, it is inconceivable on policy grounds that  the  House  of  Lords  would  decide  any  of  the  above
customer preference or appeasing the workforce examples  differently.[107]  The  move  could  be  explained  by  the
House’s perceived need to loosen the shackles of the but for test in victimisation cases, thus  validating  the  decisions
in Cornelius and Khan. The struggle with the but for test in victimisation cases  is  most  evident  in  Lord  Hoffman’s
speech in Khan. He first stated that the causal questions in the direct discrimination and victimisation provisions  were
‘not identical.’[108] This enabled him to distance the but for  test  from  the  victimisation  cases.[109]  And  this  was
because under the victimisation provisions, the reason for the treatment may be ‘...a reasonable response  to  the  need
to protect the employer’s interests as a party to the litigation’ which is not the same reason  as  the  commencement  of
the proceedings.[110] By contrast, Lord Hoffman reasoned, ‘Under section 1 [direct discrimination], one would  have
needed to go no further’ than establish ‘that an employee who had not commenced proceedings would not  have  been
treated in the same way.’[111]
With respect, this is saying no  more  than  that  because  the  employers  in  these  victimisation  cases  acted
‘reasonably’ the victimisation provisions are different and should accommodate a benign  motive  defence.  The  same
could be said of direct discrimination where defendants have acted ‘reasonably’ by trying to help  pensioners,[112]  or
protect women’s fertility, or perhaps, avoid industrial unrest or accommodate customer preferences. The  shortcoming
of Lord Hoffman’s reasoning is that it does not explain why ‘reasonable’ acts of victimisation  should  be  defendable,
whilst  ‘reasonable’  acts  of  direct  discrimination  should  not.  This  is  in  stark  contrast  to  Lord  Steyn’s  view  in
Nagarajan ‘that victimisation is as serious a mischief as direct discrimination.’[113]
A more obvious difference between the formulas is that only direct discrimination  carries  specific  Genuine
Occupational Requirement or Qualification defences,[114] tempting a suggestion that courts  should  compensate  for
their absence victimisation cases.  But,  as  the  court  in  the  Board  of  Governors  case  observed,  if  the  legislature
intended to validate victimisation where it would be rational, or financially prudent, or in ‘good faith’, or otherwise, it
would have expressed this.[115]  Shamoon removed one obstacle (the but  for  test)  to  a  benign  motive  defence  for
victimisation cases, but it did not go so far as to validate such a defence.
This establishes the technical objection to a benign motive defence in victimisation  cases.  None  appears  in
the legislation, and distinguishing the victimisation from the direct discrimination provisions cannot validate implying
such a defence.
However, the practical benefit of a benign motive defence is that it provides  a  compromise  of  sorts  to  the
victimisation dilemma. It permits employers  to  defend  litigation,  but  confers  some  control  over  their  conduct  to
tribunals. For example, in St Helens BC v Derbyshire,[116] the employer announced publicly  that  a  minority  of  the
workforce persisting with an equal pay claim were likely to cause redundancies. This effective threat was intimidating
and likely to cause the claimants fear of public odium and reproaches by colleagues.[117] The House of  Lords  found
the employer liable for victimisation under the SDA 1975. Lord  Neuberger  (who  gave  the  leading  judgment)[118]
speculated:
If ... the employer’s solicitor were to write to the employee’s solicitor setting out, in  appropriately  measured
and accurate terms, the financial or employment consequences of the claim  succeeding,  or  the  risks  to  the
employee if the claim fails, or terms of settlement which are unattractive to the employee, I do  not  see  how
any distress thereby induced in the employee could be said to constitute  ‘detriment’  ...  The  bringing  of  an
equal pay claim, however strong the claim may be, carries with it, like any other litigation inevitable  distress
and worry. Distress and worry which may be induced by the employer’s  honest  and  reasonable  conduct  in
the course of his defence or in the conduct of any settlement negotiations, cannot (save, possibly, in the most
unusual circumstances) constitute ‘detriment’ for the purposes of sections 4 and 6 of the 1975 Act.[119]
This employer went beyond what was ‘reasonable’ by going public with the threat,[120] and so  could  not  rely  on  a
benign motive in its defence. However, perhaps to escape accusations that it had created a benign motive defence,  the
Lord Neuberger has labelled  the  decision  as  turning  on  the  element  of  ‘detriment’.  As  such,  in  the  context  of
victimisation, the element of any other detriment and the notion of harm require further consideration.
C. Harm, Less Favourable, and Detriment
The question of harm appears  to  arise  twice  in  the  British  case  law:  first,  when  assessing  if  the  treatment  was
less favourable, and second, when assessing whether the claimant suffered a detriment. Khan and EOC v Birmingham
City Council show the House of  Lords  consistently  holding  that  the  treatment  is  less  favourable  if  the  claimant
perceived the treatment as less favourable, and that that perception was not  unreasonable.[121]  However,  the  courts
have also applied a standard of harm to the element any other detriment. And unlike the less favourable  element,  this
standard has varied somewhat. The general standard required was confirmed in the sex discrimination  case  Shamoon
v Chief Constable of the RUC,[122] where the House of Lords stated the question  was:  ‘Is  the  treatment  of  such  a
kind that a reasonable worker would or might take the view that in all the circumstances it was to his detriment?’[123]
In Shamoon, one of the duties of a police inspector was the appraisal of  officers.  Following  complaints  by  some  of
these officers, she was relieved of the appraisal duty. She brought a claim of  sex  discrimination.[124]  The  Northern
Ireland Court of Appeal[125] held that Ms Shamoon had not suffered a detriment because she had no ‘right’  to  carry
out appraisals and there was no accompanying loss of rank or financial loss. The House of  Lords  reversed,  and  held
that  the  loss  of  the  appraisal  work  was  a  detriment  simply  because  it   would   reduce   her   standing   amongst
colleagues.[126] Accordingly, in  Khan,[127]  Lord  Nicholls  reasoned:  ‘I  accept  Sergeant  Khan’s  claim  that  the
refusal to provide a reference for him constituted a detriment ... even though ... this did  not  cause  him  any  financial
loss. Provision of a reference is a normal feature of employment.’[128] Lord Hoffman  held:  ‘Mr  Khan  plainly  did
take the view ... that not having his assessment forwarded was to his detriment and I do not think that,  in  his  state  of
knowledge at the time, he can be said to have been  unreasonable.’[129]  His  view  was  influenced  by  the  statutory
provision allowing damages solely for injury to feelings.[130]
(i) Specific Limits to the Meaning of Detriment
On this element, Shamoon and Khan are consistent with each other and with the established meaning of what amounts
to less favourable treatment. It is same mix of the subjective and objective and  does  not  require  some  economic  or
physical consequence. However, case law has also provided one - or possibly two - limits specific  to  the  element  of
any other detriment which could affect the victimisation cases.
First, there is Court of Appeal authority that the de minimis  principle  applies  to  the  element  of  any  other
detriment. In Peake v Automotive Products[131] an employer permitted female staff to leave the factory  five  minutes
earlier ‘for reasons of safety and to avoid the rush.’ The  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  this  did  not  cause  the  men  a
‘detriment.’ Lord Denning (who presided in Peake)  explained  the  decision  later  as  being  based  solely  on  the  de
minimis principle.[132] To date, the Court of Appeal considers this good law. Although no  cases  have  been  decided
de minimis, in Jiad v Byford , May LJ observed obiter that ‘Transitory hurt feelings may not (depending on  the  facts)
suffice’ for a detriment.[133]
Ascribing the de minimis principle to the element  of  ‘detriment’  brings  two  problems.  First,  most  of  the
parent  European  Directives  mandate  that  there  should   be   ‘no   discrimination   whatsoever’   on   the   protected
grounds.[134] Thus, it is questionable if the de minimis principle is compatible with  European  law.[135]  Second,  as
noted by Lord Hoffman in Khan (above), as the legislation allows for damages for injury to  feelings,  it  would  seem
that even ‘transitory hurt feelings’ fall under this head. In Vento Chief Constable  v  West  Yorkshire  Police,[136]  the
Court of Appeal placed cases under the head of injury to feelings into three bands. The lowest band, for ‘less  serious’
cases, such as an ‘isolated or one-off occurrence’ should attract awards of between £500 and £5,000. In general, lower
awards should not be made as they risk not showing a proper recognition of the injury to feelings.[137] The court  did
not mention if it envisaged a de minimis incident falling into this lowest band, but the reference to an isolated  or  one-
off incident suggests that it could.
A possible second limit to the meaning of detriment could come about if its ‘test’  (see  Shamoon  and  Khan,
above) were reduced to a purely objective one, and required tangible harm. This is  the  implication  of  the  House  of
Lords’ reinterpretation of Khan in St Helens BC v Derbyshire,[138] where Lord  Neurberger  (with  whom  the  whole
House agreed)[139] explained Khan as turning on  the  element  of  any  other  detriment.  Although  he  repeated  the
standard from Shamoon (above), he then stated  that  because  the  denial  of  the  reference  did  not  reduce  Sergeant
Khan’s chances, the denial did not cause him a detriment.[140]  This  suggests,  contrary  to  Shamoon,  and  indeed  a
differently constituted House in Khan itself, that the matter  is  purely  objective  and  turns  on  whether  the  claimant
actually suffered tangible harm. If this logic were taken up, all no reference-no harm cases will  fail  on  this  element,
irrespective of any causative issue.
This reinterpretation of  Khan  raises  more  questions  than  it  solves.  First,  by  suggesting  that  Khan  was
decided correctly because looked at objectively, Sergeant Khan had suffered no  tangible  harm,  the  House  of  Lords
ignored their own opinion and ECJ authority that the matter should be judged from the worker’s perspective.[141]
Second, the usefulness of St Helens analysis is reduced virtually to  nil  once  it  is  appreciated  that  in  most
cases withholding a reference will harm the claimant. Normally, a reference would be positive  or  neutral,  and  so  its
withholding is very likely to damage the claimant’s job prospects. There are less  obvious  possibilities  as  well,  even
where the reference would have been negative. For instance, an employer may damage the  worker  by  informing  the
prospective employer of the reason for withholding the reference. Indeed, in Khan, the Chief Constable  wrote  to  the
Norfolk Police explaining that he withheld the reference because Khan had brought industrial tribunal proceedings. In
the US case Rutherford v American Bank of Commerce[142] an employer  was  held  liable  for  victimisation  after  it
‘eliminated’ Ms Rutherford’s chance of employment with another bank by informing  it  that  she  had  brought  a  sex
discrimination claim. This is enough  to  dissuade  many  employers  from  selecting  a  candidate.  Even  on  a  purely
objective test, this alone would be  detrimental  to  the  worker.  And  even  if  it  proved  not  detrimental  to  Khan,  a
reasonable worker would be entitled to fear so, which would lead to liability under the Khan or  Shamoon  ‘reasonable
worker’ test. It is also the case that even where the employer does not provide a  reason,  the  claimant  could  suffer  a
detriment simply because she would still present an incomplete application, excluding her from any selection process.
Third, all these harmful outcomes could arise for exactly the same reason as the ‘harmless’ scenario in Khan:
that the employer was acting on legal advice to protect its position in the principal proceedings. As such, the  message
sent out by Cornelius and Khan that employers may defend litigation in  the  normal  way  is  highly  misleading.  The
logic of St Helens places the employer’s defence into the hands of fortune. The examples above show that only  rarely
will the claimant suffer no detriment, and where a reference is withheld, this normally will be  beyond  the  control  of
the employer. Harm is even more likely when suspending a grievance process[143] (which suggests the House’s  tacit
approval of Cornelius is suspect).[144]  The  irony  of  the  House  of  Lords’  analysis  of  Khan  is  that  in  trying  to
legitimise the reactions of ‘reasonable’ employers, it has reduced their defence virtually to nil.
(ii) Other Issues with the Harm Principle
More generally,  associating  the  element  any  other  detriment  with  a  harm  principle  raises  four  issues.  First,  it
overlooks the deterrent effect on claimants. Second,  it  omits  deterrent  effect  on  other  workers.  Third,  it  restricts
tribunals’ ability to order an appropriate remedy to prevent damage. Fourth, it could produce an anomaly.
               First, the St Helens reinterpretation of  Khan  was  described  above  as  a  possible  limit  to  the  element  of
detriment because on the facts before it the House of Lords found St Helens Borough Council  liable.  Yet,  just  as  in
Khan, the claimants were not physically of financially damaged by  the  council’s  public  threat.  The  decision  in  St
Helens is better explained by reverting to the purpose of the victimisation provisions. This was articulated by the  ECJ
in  Coote  v  Granada.[145]  Here,  Mrs  Coote  sued  her  employer  following  her   dismissal   for   being   pregnant.
Subsequently, and after those proceedings were dead, the employer refused to  give  her  a  reference  and  Mrs  Coote
sued again, this time for victimisation. The ECJ held that ex-workers must be protected from victimisation, otherwise:
Fear  of  such  measures,  where  no  legal  remedy  is  available  against  them,  might   deter   workers   who
considered themselves the victims of  discrimination  from  pursuing  their  claims  by  judicial  process,  and
would consequently be liable  seriously  to  jeopardise  implementation  of  the  aim  pursued  by  the  [Equal
Treatment] Directive.[146]
Similarly in the United States, in Robinson v Shell,[147]  the  Supreme  Court  stated  that  a  primary  purpose  of  the
victimisation provisions is ‘Maintaining unfettered access to  statutory  remedial  mechanisms.’  The  Court  held  that
providing a retaliatory negative reference for an ex-employee  whilst  discrimination  proceedings  were  pending  was
unlawful. It noted that a decision otherwise would effectively vitiate much of the protection afforded by  Title  VII  of
the Civil Rights Act 1964, by allowing the threat of post-employment  retaliation  to  deter  victims  of  discrimination
from complaining, and providing a  perverse  incentive  for  employers  to  fire  workers  who  might  bring  Title  VII
claims.[148]  In  both  Coote  and  Robinson,  the  central  issue  was  whether  ex-workers  were  protected,   but   the
underlying principle in each decision is that the purpose  of  the  victimisation  provisions  is  to  outlaw  deterrents  to
using the discrimination legislation.
Clearly, the claimants in St Helens could  have  been  deterred  from  pursuing  their  equal  pay  claim,  even
though they were caused no tangible harm. This reasoning was not apparent in the speeches as the  reinterpretation  of
Khan  overshadowed  the  ratio  decidendi  of  St  Helens,  which,  logically,  centred  on  the  deterrent  effect  of  the
employer’s action, rather than any notion of harm.
Second, a principle demanding that the claimant suffers harm, or  is  deterred,  excludes  conduct  that  could
deter others from complaining about discrimination (or supporting such complaints). This  has  been  characterised  in
some US courts as the ‘chilling’ effect of victimisation and is most apparent in the job-reference cases.
In the United States, the ‘fear of deterrent’ purpose articulated in Robinson v  Shell  was  presumed  to  cover
third parties by the reputedly progressive Ninth Circuit. In Hashimoto v Dalton[149] Ms Hashimoto made a Title  VII
complaint whilst working for the Navy. After she was made redundant,  but  whilst  her  complaint  was  pending,  she
applied for a post with the Army. Her supervisor, Lowery, provided an undue negative job reference in retaliation  for
her discrimination complaint. However, Hashimoto’s job application  failed  for  other  reasons  and  so  the  reference
caused her no harm. Nonetheless, she brought a subsequent case of victimisation. The  Court  of  Appeals  upheld  her
claim. It was concerned with ‘... the chilling effect which Lowery’s retaliatory conduct might have  on  the  remaining
employees under his supervision ...’ and concluded that
... the retaliatory dissemination of a negative employment reference violates Title VII,  even  if  the  negative
reference does not affect the prospective employer’s decision not  to  hire  the  victim  of  the  discriminatory
action.[150]
Robinson and Hashimoto differ from Khan because references (albeit  negative)  were  provided.  Hashimoto
and Khan stand out because the workers’ job prospects were not damaged. Coote is distinguishable  because  although
the claimant’s job prospects were damaged (it was  alleged),  she  could  not  have  been  deterred  from  pursuing  her
principal claim, as that had already been settled. Given that the ECJ expressed its judgment as based on  the  deterrent
principle,  their  finding  for  Mrs  Coote  appears  curious.  An  explanation  is  discernable  in  the  US  case  Smith  v
SEIU.[151] Here, the plaintiff brought discrimination proceedings against his ex-employer, a trade union. After  these
proceedings were dead, the employer ‘bad-mouthed’ Smith in the industry, making it difficult for  him  to  get  further
work. He sued for victimisation. The defendant employer argued that no reasonable person in Smith’s position  would
be deterred by this retaliatory conduct. The principal proceedings were dead and Smith  was  no  longer  employed  by
the union. In other words, Smith ‘had nothing to fear, and nothing to  lose.’  A  district  court  rejected  this  argument.
Citing Hashimoto, it stated: ‘If defendants’ interpretation  were  correct,  a  retaliation  claim  could  never  arise  from
conduct that occurs after protected activity. This is untenable.’[152]
               This gets closer to the issue. It would be ‘untenable’ if it were lawful for employers  simply  to  wait  for  the
principal action to conclude, and then  victimise  the  claimant.  Indeed,  this  point  was  made  by  Lord  Hoffman  in
Khan.[153]  The effect would be two-fold. It would punish  (or  ‘harm’)  the  claimant  for  having  complained  about
discrimination, and it would deter others from making such complaints. The only ‘deterrent’ here is  to  others,  as  the
claimant’s case has concluded. The same could be said of Coote. If - as the ECJ declared - the purpose  of  the  law  of
victimisation is to allay fears of deterrents, and the claimant can no longer  be  deterred  from  pursuing  her  principal
claim because it has been  settled,  the  only  persons  who  possibly  could  be  deterred  from  making  or  supporting
complaints are other workers. Thus, it could be said logically that the decision in  Coote  did  not  depend  on  whether
Mrs Coote’s job prospects actually were damaged; the deciding factor was that  the  employer’s  conduct  could  deter
others from ‘pursuing their claims by judicial process.’[154] Focussing on tangible harm  to  the  claimant  misses  the
broader purpose of victimisation law, which is to outlaw conduct that could deter the claimant or other  workers  from
enforcing anti-discrimination law.
               A third issue arising from the requirement of harm is that it restricts remedies preventing future damage. For
instance, a worker in fear of her job prospects being damaged by the absence of a reference would have  to  wait  until
damage was done before bringing an action  for  victimisation.  In  Hashimoto,  costs  and  a  remedial  order,  but  not
damages, were awarded to the victim.[155] Thus, if liability depended on whether the refusal could deter the claimant
or others from using the legislation, a  tribunal  could  make  a  recommendation[156]  that  the  employer  provides  a
reference, thus preventing damage to the claimant and dispelling the deterrent to others. If the problem were remedied
at this early stage, damages would be minimal.
Fourth, demanding a certain degree of harm for the element any other detriment overlooks that  this  element
is only one of many categories of employment-related conduct which is unlawful.  Where,  for  instance,  a  case  falls
within terms of employment or access to training, benefits etc,[157] there can be no workable de minimis principle:  if
the less favourable treatment relates to the terms of employment or training, benefits etc, the  employment  element  is
met. There can be no question of degree with this element.[158] The anomaly  is  that  less  favourable  treatment  that
produced no tangible harm would be unlawful if it related to a term or benefit of employment, but lawful  if  it  related
only to any other detriment. Thus, had Khan couched his claim as a depravation of  a  benefit[159]  (as  Lord  Mackay
presumed)[160] no question of detriment would have arisen, leaving no scope for the House of Lords in St  Helens  to
explain the Khan decision as turning on the absence of a detriment.
British courts have taken the  element  any  other  detriment  and  ascribed  to  it  various  standards  of  harm
required for liability. This focus on harm resembles the question of whether  the  treatment  was  less  favourable,  and
tends to duplicate that question, save that the limits placed on what amounts to a detriment have produced an anomaly
and thrown up a number of problems. These limits, especially as suggested in St Helens, will: (1) only apply  to  cases
where  the claim is pleaded under any  other  detriment  and  the  claimant  suffered  no  harm;  (2)  exclude  from  the
provisions conduct that only deters the (unharmed) claimant or other workers; and (3) in some  cases  deny  a  remedy
that would prevent an employer causing future damage to the claimant. Further,  these  limits  enfeeble  any  so-called
honest  and  reasonable  defence  because  they  render  the  employer’s  defence  (of  protecting   its   legal   position)
dependant on whether per chance the claimant suffered no harm, which in any event would be most unusual.
(iii) Distinguishing Detrimental from Less Favourable
At the root of these problems is the blurring of two distinct elements. The  standard  of  treatment  and  harm  (if  any)
required should belong to the element treats less favourably, whilst the element subjecting him to any other  detriment
is concerned principally to ensure that  the  treatment  is  employment-related.  The  problem  is  the  undue  emphasis
towards harm given to this second element and the differing standards ascribed to it.
A logical solution is to hold that establishing less favourable  treatment  is  sufficient  to  establish  any  other
detriment. However, in Khan, Lord Hoffman observed: ‘A person may be treated  less  favourably  and  yet  suffer  no
detriment.’[161] He explained how the absence of a reference was less favourable (because of injury  to  feelings)  but
not detrimental because it caused Khan no economic loss.[162] But then curiously in  the  same  paragraph  he  stated,
‘But, bearing in mind that the employment tribunal has jurisdiction to award compensation to  injury  to  feelings,  the
courts have given the term “detriment” a wide meaning.’[163] Upon this, Lord Hoffman held that Khan  had  suffered
a detriment, because given his state of knowledge at the time, Khan’s view that he had suffered  a  detriment  was  not
unreasonable.[164] The matter was further confused by the analysis of Khan by a differently constituted  House  in  St
Helens, who considered that Sergeant Khan had not suffered  a  detriment.[165]  This  confusion  alone  is  enough  to
support an equalising of standards. And with respect to Lord Hoffman, to layperson and lawyer alike, the  notion  that
the same treatment is less favourable but not detrimental is anomalous, confusing,[166] and shows another drift  away
from the ‘straightforward’ approach urged by the House of Lords in Nagarajan.[167]
Although an equalising of standards is a logical solution, it is also a distraction from  the  proper  function  of
this element, which is ensuring that treatment was work-related. For claims falling under any other detriment, liability
should depend upon whether there was work-related less favourable treatment on a prohibited ground (in this  context
a protected act). The practical solution  for  claimants  is,  where  possible,  to  plead  a  case  under  one  of  the  other
‘employment-related’ headings, such as other benefits. For this  purpose,  references[168]  and  grievance  procedures
should be considered benefits of employment.
This American approach is more clear-cut. In its most recent pronouncement on  victimisation,  the  Supreme
Court, in  Burlington Northern v White,[169] addressed  the  two  elements  separately:  first,  holding  that  the  range
employment-related treatment was not confined just to altering the terms of employment;[170] and second, explaining
the degree of harm required for liability (the less favourable question).[171]
A change of approach will be forced upon the British courts  should  the  Government  fulfil  its  proposal  to
abolish the comparative element (less favourable treatment) and replace it with ‘subjected to a  detriment’.[172]  This
would bring the victimisation provisions in discrimination law into  line  with  the  growing  number  of  victimisation
provisions provided by Part V of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which cover areas such as  whistle  blowing,  jury
service, health and safety, Sunday working, family leave, and working time rights.
Whilst the disposal of the comparative element and any anomalies between less favourable and  detriment  is
welcome, the danger is that it permits courts more discretion on what standard of harm is required for  liability.  If  the
courts import the limited meaning of detriment (incorporating say,  de  minimis  and  the  St  Helens  ‘objective  harm’
standard), the limits will apply to all employment victimisation claims, rather than just those falling  under  the  catch-
all phrase any other detriment. Thus, the benefit of losing any anomalies is offset by the more restrictive  regime.  The
scant case law on this phrase in the Employment Rights Act points to this outcome. In Harrow LB v  Knight,[173]  Mr
Recorder Underhill QC ruled that the claimant should have suffered ‘some identifiable detriment’,[174] suggesting an
‘objective harm’ standard.
               A better amendment would be to replace the comparative element with the phrase treats  unfavourably.  This
should  be  accompanied  by  a  replacement  of  the  phrase  any  other  detriment  with   a   ‘catch-all’   phrase   other
employment-related  treatment,[175]  thus  signalling  that  its  purpose  merely  is  to  ensure  that   the   unfavourable
treatment was employment-related. Of course, for the avoidance of doubt, it would be  better  if  these  purposes  were
spelt out. Unless otherwise expressed in the legislation, this will catch cases where the claimant is harmed or deterred,
or where third parties are deterred.
6. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS - THE VICTIMISATION DILEMMA
The case law signals that both employer and worker have a claim on the court’s sympathy. The prominent polices  are
to preclude deterrents to using the discrimination legislation, and to allow employers to  defend  litigation.  The  cases
show that these aims often conflict and a benign motive defence (however it is dressed-up) provides a compromise.
The employer facing litigation from  a  worker  is  in  a  difficult  position.  At  some  stage  in  litigation  the
employer will treat the claimant less favourably than it would treat a  person  who  has  brought  no  proceedings.  For
example, no one would suggest that a tribunal should excuse a claimant or  her  witnesses[176]  from  rigorous  cross-
examination. If the employer must treat the litigant as it would treat a person who had not brought proceedings of  any
nature, the logical conclusion is that the employer cannot defend its case. By default the employer would lose most,  if
not all, claims of victimisation.
Sympathy for this perspective was cogently expressed by Lord Scott in Khan  who  stated  that  an  employer
would ‘otherwise be placed...in an unacceptable  Morton’s  fork.’[177]  It  was  robustly  expressed  by  Circuit  Judge
Jacobs in New York City Transit, who declared  that  employers  should  be  ‘free  to  choose  to  act  in  a  benign  and
sympathetic way by satisfying grievances and settling disputes, or to proceed aggressively with litigation.’[178]
On the other hand, focussing on the predicament of the employer undermines  the  policy  of  the  provisions,
which is to preclude deterrents to the enforcement of the anti-discrimination  legislation.  This  means  looking  at  the
conduct from the perspective of the workers, and was advanced with some force in St Helens, citing ECJ authority  on
the matter.[179]  In  Khan,  the  Law  Lords’  speeches  are  replete  with  statements  sympathetic  to  the  employers’
dilemma. Nowhere did a judge express sympathy for the workers whose reference is withheld; as well as having acted
just as ‘honestly and  reasonably’  as  the  employer,  these  workers  will  have  their  career  frozen  for  the  duration
(conceivably several years) of the proceedings, simply because they complained of discrimination. This approach also
places the worker in an ‘unacceptable Morton’s fork’, choosing to suffer either discrimination or a  frozen  career.   In
cases of suspended grievance processes, the worker loses the chance of an informal resolution to a complaint,  instead
having the choice of the costs, time and stress of formal proceedings, or  dropping  the  complaint  altogether.  Indeed,
where the grievance process is likely to exceed the  limitation  period,  the  worker’s  hand  is  forced.[180]  A  further
potential disadvantage with suspending the grievance process  is  that  the  worker’s  opportunity  to  have  unlitigated
matters resolved may be lost altogether.[181]
These competing interests should be a matter for Parliament to resolve, within the bounds  of  the  ‘deterrent’
principle set out by the ECJ in Coote. As such, employers should given all possible  scope  to  defend  litigation,  save
where it injures or deters the claimant, or deters other employees.[182]
7. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
The consistent factor in the Khan and St Helens judgments is the  House  of  Lords’  sympathy  with  the  ‘honest  and
reasonable’ employer’s dilemma. The distinction between the bringing and existence of proceedings,  the  honest  and
reasonable ‘defence’, and the  finding  of  no  tangible  detriment,  were  all  vehicles  to  deliver  this  sympathy.  The
reasoning  carries  technical  flaws,  the  essence  of  which  is  that  the  statutory  formula  carries  no  scope  for  this
sympathy.  If,  as  suggested,  policy  dictates  that  employers  should  have  some  scope  to  defend  proceedings,  an
alternative theory of victimisation is required.
A. Parallels with Direct and Indirect Discrimination
In both Nagarajan and the Board of Governors, one reason for rejecting the benign motive defence  was  the  analogy
with the ‘parallel’ provision of direct discrimination, where such a defence strictly is outlawed.  Only  Lord  Hoffman,
in Khan, attempted  openly  to  distinguish  the  direct  discrimination  and  the  victimisation  formulas,  although  his
reasoning was unconvincing.[183] Lord Hoffman overlooked a significant difference between the two formulas:  only
direct discrimination carries specific Genuine Occupational Requirement defences. As such, the victimisation formula
is more restrictive, as the legislature has provided no defence, specific or general.
However, the employer’s predicament provides a clue to a more fundamental flaw in an analogy  with  direct
discrimination. The employer’s argument in defence of its policy to deny a reference or grievance process is two-fold.
First, it wants to defend its case properly. Second, it is a general policy that does not single out those who complain of
discrimination. This second argument provides the clue. If the policy is of general application, then it is  arguable  that
it is neutral on its face.  This  makes  it  more  akin  to  indirect  discrimination,  which,  of  course,  carries  a  general
justification defence, which would accommodate an employer’s benign motive. In the US case, EEOC v  Huber,[184]
a worker sued for discriminatory dismissal,  seeking  reinstatement.  Her  employer  withheld  her  retirement  benefits
because she sought reinstatement. This was because if the employer paid benefits to persons while the validity  of  her
dismissal was uncertain and who had a realistic possibility of being reinstated, the tax-exempt status of the plan  could
be lost for all participants. This was the policy for all dismissed workers who sought reinstatement, not just  for  those
whose claims were based on discrimination.[185] The court held that the policy was permissible because:
[G]iven Huber’s fiduciary obligations to the other plan participants, the  policy  of  withholding  benefit  plan
funds is not facially pretextual and appears to be significantly related to a legitimate business concern.[186]
The  court  embraced  the  employer’s  ‘benign  motive’  defence  by  treating  the  case  as  one   of   indirect
discrimination. This was achieved by analysing the policy as  a  facially  neutral  one,  which  affected  any  dismissed
worker seeking reinstatement.[187]
This is an  attractive  approach  which  equally  could  be  applied  to  Cornelius,  Khan,  Sparrow,  Board  of
Governors, and New York City Transit, because, as in  Huber,  general  policies   to  suspend  a  grievance  process  or
withhold a reference would affect all workers who issued proceedings, not just those claiming discrimination. But this
conclusion starkly contrasts with the analysis in Board of Governors, which reasoned that ‘broadening’ a policy made
it no less effective against the plaintiff who had brought a (protected) discrimination claim.
So, here are two apparently logical conclusions that conflict. Any reconciliation  comes  from  understanding
that each is half-right. Huber may appear to be an unconventional decision, but in fact  it  perpetuates  the  notion  that
discrimination and victimisation are parallel concepts, which facilitates the direct/indirect discrimination  analysis  for
victimisation cases. The error with this analysis is that in most conventional discrimination cases there  is  a  protected
class identifiable by one single characteristic, be it sex, sexual  orientation,  religion,  or  race,  etc.  Normally,  it  is  a
straightforward task to distinguish a facially discriminatory from a facially neutral practice.[188] The  reason  for  this
is that the protected class is easily identified by a single factor, be it the sex, sexual  orientation,  religion,  or  race,  of
the claimant. By contrast, the protected persons in victimisation  cases  are  identified  by  what  they  have  done:  the
protected activity. And in the instant cases, the protected activity  requires  two  factors  to  be  identified:  (1)  issuing
proceedings and (2) for discrimination.[189] The challenged practice, triggered  by  just  ‘issuing  proceedings,’  is  in
part,  facially  neutral  and  in  part  facially  discriminatory,  as  in  these  cases  the   nature   of   the   proceedings   is
discrimination. So Huber was half right in identifying claiming reinstatement as the (facially  neutral)  ground  of  the
retaliation, and  Board  of  Governors  was  half  right  when  identifying  an  age  discrimination  complaint  (facially
discriminatory) as the ground for the  retaliation.  The  court  in  Huber  omitted  the  facially  discriminatory  element
whilst in Board of Governors it omitted the facially neutral element. For victimisation, the distinction  between  direct
and indirect discrimination becomes ‘fuzzy at the border’[190] and analogies with director or  indirect  discrimination
theory are not particularly rational or helpful.
B. Parallels with Disability-Related Discrimination - Victimisation by Proxy
A more appropriate and useful analogy can be made  with  disability  discrimination,  which  has  its  own  solution  to
‘fuzzy border’ cases. Disability discrimination is prone to these ‘fuzzy  border’  cases  because  frequently  apparently
neutral policies are directed at a manifestation of a  disability,  rather  than  the  disability  itself.  Examples  include  a
restaurant’s no dogs rule,[191] or the dismissal of any worker on long-term sick leave[192] or of postal  workers  who
walk slowly, or of typists who produce misspelt letters.[193]
These examples compare with some victimisation cases, where the employer’s  apparently  neutral  policy  is
directed at a manifestation of the worker’s protected act (proceedings) rather than the nature of the act (discrimination
or harassment). These cases are also on the fuzzy border between direct and indirect discrimination.[194]
The  solution  for  disability  law  is  provided  by  an  additional  model  of  discrimination.   The   Disability
Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA 1995) provides a hybrid theory of  disability-related  discrimination.[195]  Under  the
Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, the  US  courts  developed  a  similar  hybrid  model:  direct  discrimination  by
proxy.[196] Either variety comes with a justification defence.[197] In  a  similar  way,  some  victimisation  cases  are
more accurately analysed as protected act-related  discrimination,  or  less  awkwardly,  victimisation  by  proxy.  The
manifestation of the protected act is the issuing of legal proceedings, which is the target of the  employer’s  retaliatory
policy. But the policy is related to the  protected  act,  and  so  should  attract  scrutiny  under  the  victimisation  laws.
Although this theory provides a neater analysis of these victimisation cases, its chief attraction, and  perhaps  practical
benefit, is its justification defence.
(i) The Justification Defence
The next issue is defining the justification defence for this purpose. Under the DDA  1995,  the  defence,  provided  in
Jones v Post Office,[198] is somewhat lax and anomalous, requiring only that the employer  acted  within  a  range  of
reasonable responses.[199] This laxity does not present such a problem in disability  law  because  in  most  cases  the
employer would also have a duty to make reasonable adjustments, nonetheless, the Government plans  to  replace  this
defence with the standard ‘proportionate means of achieving  a  legitimate  aim’  formula.[200]  Therefore,  the  better
path is to avoid the anomalous Jones formula. This still leaves a number of options.
The standard justification formula  -   used  in  equal  pay  and  indirect  discrimination  cases  -  requires  the
employer to show that the  policy  is  genuine  (legitimate  aim),  appropriate  and  necessary  (proportionate).  This  is
known as the ‘Bilka test’.[201] The formula requires the aim to be ‘irrespective’ of  the  protected  ground,  eg  sex  or
race etc.[202] Here, because the prime facie victimisation is related to a protected act, the defence  cannot  necessarily
be ‘irrespective’ of the protected act - by its nature, the defence must have more  leeway  than  usual.  Nevertheless,  it
should be able to be applied with some coherence, as the ‘legitimate aim’ should be related to  the  ‘manifestation’  of
the  protected  act,  such  as  legal  proceedings,  whatever  their  nature.  If  the  aim  were  related  to  the   nature   of
discrimination proceedings (eg sex or race etc), then there  should  be  liability  under  ‘direct’  victimisation,  or  even
direct (eg sex or  race) discrimination.
Take the scenarios where the employer has suspended a grievance process  or  denied  a  reference,  with  the
stated aim of defending itself in the forthcoming trial. This response is likely to be genuine if  it  is  no  more  than  an
invocation of a general policy that applies across a class of cases, not just discrimination ones. If it  were  invoked  for
the first time in a discrimination case, it would be suspicious.[203]
The response should be appropriate. This rules out underhand or even illegal tactics (and so in part  coincides
with the honest and reasonable test.) Two American cases illustrate this. In Berry v Stevenson Chevrolet[204] a  sales
manager paid his salesman their  due  bonuses  out  of  his  own  pocket,  and  later,  when  the  manufactures’  cheque
arrived, he forged a signature and cashed it for himself. His employer discovered the forgery and formed a  reasonable
suspicion that the manager had committed a fraud. Later, the manager sued  for  racial  discrimination.  The  employer
retaliated by reporting the suspected fraud to the police. The manager was acquitted of any criminal  wrongdoing  and
his claim for victimisation succeeded. Similarly, in Rochon v Gonzales,[205] the FBI was held to  have  victimised  an
agent (who had previously complained of  racial  harassment)  by  refusing,  contrary  to  policy,  to  investigate  death
threats a federal prisoner made against the agent and his wife. The conclusion reached by  the  House  of  Lords  in  St
Helens also accords with this analysis, as the employer acted inappropriately by ‘going public’.
The response should also be necessary to achieve the aim. An employer cannot try to  win  at  all  costs.  The
indications from Cornelius, Khan, and St Helens, are that the employer is permitted to do what the  courts  consider  is
normal legal practice. A further consideration at the ‘necessity’ stage is  weighing  the  employer’s  needs  against  the
harm done, such as damage to the claimant, and/or the deterrent effect on the claimant and others.
This provides a neat, technically sound solution that restores some logic and certainty to the law. Its  merit  is
that it would encompass all genuine and proportionate reactions to litigation, even those undreamt  of,  or  not  strictly
related to defending the claim, such as in Huber.205a This would allow the courts  -  legitimately  -  to  evaluate  each
defence on its merits according to known and predictable criteria.
There would remain less predictable borderline cases, such as where issues  other  than  those  litigated  were
also part of the grievance (Board of Governors).[206]  On  the  face  of  it,  a  denial  of  a  grievance  process  for  the
unlitigated matters would appear disproportionate. But an employer may show that  it  is  impossible  to  untangle  the
facts relating to both matters and so a grievance process for the unlitigated matter could compromise its defence of the
litigated matter. Here, at least the parties would know  by  what  criteria  the  matter  would  be  judged,  unlike  at  the
present, where, unpredictably, the matter could be turn on defences such as reacting to  the  existence  rather  than  the
commencement of proceedings, or not causing a detriment (varying standards), or acting honestly and reasonably.
The demerit of this general justification defence is that it would hand to the courts formally a discretion  over
policy and could  legitimise  other  undreamt-of  or  pernicious  arguments  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  defending
litigation. Indeed the Court of Appeal in St Helens accepted that the employer had acted  honestly  and  reasonably  by
making its ‘effective threat’ to the claimants.206a  Alternatively,  an  employer  may  argue  it  defends  ruthlessly  all
worker-litigation whatever its merit just to signal that it is not a soft touch, an aim barely related (if at all)  to  any  one
particular claim. Of course, such an aim defeats the  ‘deterrent’  purpose  of  the  victimisation  law,  but  this  purpose
could become lost (as it was inter alia in St Helens206b) in a general justification defence. This prompts a notion of  a
narrower justification defence,  confined  to  defending  the  claimant’s  litigation.  But  this  would  exclude  defences
worthy of consideration, such as that in Huber, and so should be discarded.
A further objection to a defence rooted in Bilka is  that  the  starting  point  for  objective  justification  is  the
employer’s goal. As such, it reverses the principle advanced in  Coote  v  Granada,[207]    that  the  matter  should  be
viewed from the workers’ perspective. So, for instance, an employer arguing that things said  in  a  grievance  hearing,
or job reference, may prejudice its defence at trial, is doing so from its perspective. Such evidence may  prejudice  the
employer’s defence, but it may not necessarily prejudice the trial  or  justice  per  se.  This  leaves  the  court  with  the
discretion of deciding how much leeway the employer should be given, a situation once again leading  to  uncertainty.
For  instance,  the  leeway  suggested  in   New   York   City   Transit   (employers   should   be   ‘free   to   ...   proceed
aggressively’)[208]  goes further than that suggested in Khan (‘honest and reasonable’). And in St Helens, honest  and
reasonable meant something quite different to the Court of Appeal than it did to the House of Lords. As such,  it  may
be better to enact some more specific exceptions, in a similar  way  to  the  Genuine  Occupational  Requirements  laid
down for direct discrimination. Parliament should decide policy  and  expressly  permit  or  outlaw  specific  reactions
such as suspending a grievance process and withholding a reference. The  general  doctrine  of  the  parent  Directives
would ensure that any exceptions should be genuine, and applied proportionately.
Thus, the optimum solution is to combine the objective justification defence  with  some  specified  examples
of what is and what is not permissible. This allows Parliament to dictate policy while leaving scope for unpredicted or
innovative defences to be assessed by common criteria.
(ii) One or Two Cause of Action?
There  remains  the  question  of  whether  victimisation  by  proxy  should  stand  as  the  only  cause   of   action   for
victimisation, or be in addition  to  the  existing  ‘direct’  victimisation  provision.  If  it  were  the  only  option,  every
defendant would have a chance to justify its conduct, no matter how pernicious the retaliation. For the sake of  clarity,
it would be better to preserve the original provision - ‘direct  victimisation’  -  with  the  suggested  amendments,[209]
accompanied by guidance, similar to that provided for direct discrimination in  the  DDA  1995,[210]  confining  it  to
where the unfavourable treatment was in response to the protected act, rather than a manifestation of it.
A technical concern here is that it is hard to imagine a case like this (where the defendant’s  motive  included
the discrimination element of the protected act) that does  not  amount  also  to  a  case  of  direct  discrimination.  For
instance, an employer who singles out for victimisation a worker who complains of racial discrimination is  acting  on
the  ground  of  race,  even  where  that  worker  complained  on  behalf  of  a  colleague.  This  implies  that  a   direct
victimisation provision would be redundant. However, this coincidence will be  less  common  in  cases  where  direct
discrimination must on the ground of the complainant’s sex, or gender reassignment,  or  age,  or  disability.[211]  For
example, an employer may deny a pay rise to a male worker  for  giving  evidence  in  support  of  female  colleague’s
sexual harassment complaint. The victimisation was not on the ground of the witnesses’ sex and so could  not  amount
to direct sex discrimination under the present definition. Thus, a direct victimisation provision should be preserved for
these grounds at least, and to avoid any undreamt-of cases escaping liability, it would be better to preserve it in all the
statutes.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Reframe the existing victimisation definition, with the qualification  that  it  applies  only  to  ‘direct’  victimisation.
Guidance on this should be provided in a similar way to that provided for direct discrimination under the  DDA  1995.
In addition, the comparative element should be repealed as planned, but replaced with treats unfavourably, rather than
the planned cause a detriment.
2. Enact an additional cause of action: victimisation by proxy, with a general justification defence based  on  the  Bilka
model, but with some defences specified as lawful or unlawful.
3. The purpose of the provisions should be expressed in the legislation, which is to  ensure  that  workers  can  enforce
the discrimination legislation without fear  of  deterrents.  These  workers  include  complainants,  those  who  support
them, and third parties who could be deterred  from  making  or  supporting  complaints  in  the  future.  For  example,
where other workers could be deterred by the employer’s action, it is not necessary for the claimant to suffer  tangible
harm for liability.[212] This allows a tribunal to order that the employer cease  the  challenged  practice,  and  provide
costs for the claimant.
4. Replace the phrase any other detriment in the employment sections  with  a  ‘catch-all’  phrase  other  employment-
related treatment.
5. Consider reversing the time-bar rule in Robinson v Post Office,[213] and enact a rule that time begins to run  in  the
normal way after the grievance process has been exhausted.[214]
9. CONCLUSION
The two scenarios, and the variations discussed, are representative of the victimisation dilemma. The US  cases  show
that this is not a peculiarly British problem. At present, the constrained statutory formula provides no  leeway  for  the
employer’s position.  Yet  courts  sympathetic  to  employers  have  dictated  policy  and,  under  a  variety  of  guises,
provides employers with a benign motive defence. This has produced an incoherent  and  technically  flawed  body  of
case law. In essence, the courts have produced  an  honest  and  reasonable  defence  (which  does  not  appear  in  the
legislation), and fallacious notions that reasonable conduct will rarely cause a detriment, or that there  is  a  substantial
difference between the bringing and the existence of proceedings. Further, there  has  been  covert  use  of  the  flawed
Kirby comparison. The fault does not lie entirely with the courts. They have been compelled to squeeze a broad  range
of cases into a single narrow statutory formula, which does not envisage the more subtle facts represented by  the  two
scenarios.
At  the  heart  of  the  problem  is  the  constrained  statutory  formula  and  absence  of  policy  expressed  by
Parliament. The law of victimisation requires redefining to recognise  different  classes  of  victimisation  and  provide
leeway for employers to defend litigation, but under a predictable  and  controlled  regime.  The  predictability  would
benefit employers and claimants alike.
               This article poses more policy questions than it solves. But these questions are likely to require  solutions  in
any case. It would be better for Parliament to do this than the courts to carry on ad hoc under  a  constrictive  statutory
formula. Parliament can decide more precisely where the line should be  drawn  between  the  conflicting  interests.  It
can research and single out particular scenarios and designate particular responses  as  lawful  or  unlawful.  However,
the overriding principle in this exercise must be the purpose of this law, which is to ensure  that  workers  can  enforce
the discrimination legislation without fear of deterrents.
The tension, between this principle and an employer’s right to defend litigation, is not fully resolvable. But  a
new regime would at least  ease  the  tension  somewhat  by  defining  policy  and  providing  clearer  and  predictable
boundaries.
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